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between single ships. It is, however, as we have said above, with fleet engagements that navies have to concern themselves principally, and in these, when close action is joined and the rams leaving the shelter of the heavy ships enter the confusion of the *mêlée*, the necessity of great speed will not be apparent. It is not a question of pursuing a single ship and manœuvring perhaps for hours to obtain a commanding position from which to ram; but, on the contrary, a sudden charge in the midst of a crowd of ships and a rain of projectiles and the delivering of a sudden blow; or failing that, an attempt on the next astern; in all, a matter of minutes, perhaps seconds. The author's reasoning, therefore, that the necessity for high speed demands heavy boilers, powerful engines, a strong hull, and hence a high displacement, is deprived of its foundation. That the ram type of vessels should be a special class may be justly questioned. Battleships themselves, it is sometimes argued, will make the most convenient rams.

In considering tactical formations the author has indicated nine, and finally settles upon "line ahead," or what we call "column," as the battle formation. His reasons, such as the flexibility, convenience, and other virtues of this disposition of his ships, are clear and convincing. His ruling conception of the battle is two such columns engaging each other on parallel lines, and at from 1000 to 3000 yards distance, with their lighter vessels also in column on their outer flanks. He speaks of tactical manœuvres, probably preceding the battle, and perhaps following the opening of fire, but his reference to these is vague, and he contents himself as to details with the advantage of his smoke blowing from him towards the enemy, and of the sun dazzling the eyes of hostile gunners rather than his own.

Mr. Wilson's vagueness as to the tactics of fleets represents quite faithfully the condition of the naval mind at the present day, and since his book is avowedly a record of facts, and claims for itself no originality of suggestion, it is a merit rather than a fault that he should by simple omission call attention to this condition of affairs, and to the almost grotesque position of modern navies in regard to naval tactics.

Two other principal chapters of the second volume are "Ironclad Catastrophes," and "The Development of the English Battle-ship." They are recommended to the reader as both interesting and instructive, and we regret that space does not permit our giving extracts from their many excellent descriptions.

H. C. TAYLOR.

Studies in Diplomacy. Translated from the French of Count BENEDETTI. (London and New York: Macmillan and Co. 1896. Pp. lxxix, 323.)

COUNT BENEDETTI has set for himself a difficult task. Charged by French writers and politicians with having inefficiently discharged his mis-

sion at Ems, he has undertaken to vindicate himself from that aspersion. In that undertaking he has perhaps succeeded, but he has endeavored to do more. He has also sought to show, first, that the Duc de Gramont, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, was responsible for his failure to secure peace, and, second, that Prussia was responsible for the ensuing war. He had, he maintains, effected a satisfactory adjustment of differences, when the Duc de Gramont intervened with an improper demand and upset it ; but he holds Prussia responsible for the French declaration of war that followed. These contentions are not in their nature necessarily and wholly inconsistent. The Duc de Gramont may have blundered, and yet may not have been altogether responsible for the war. But Count Benedetti, in his attempt to cast the whole responsibility on Prussia, does not succeed in maintaining the consistency of his positions.

The fact is now well established, as Count Benedetti asserts, that the candidacy of Prince Leopold for the Spanish throne was warmly sanctioned and supported by Bismarck in 1870, for political reasons. The existence of Prussian intrigue was suspected by France at the time, and this suspicion largely accounts for the violence of the opposition exhibited to the candidacy in that country. In the midst of the excitement Benedetti was officially instructed to repair to Ems, where King William was then staying, and to obtain from him a promise that he would advise Prince Leopold to withdraw his acceptance of the Spanish overtures. In a private letter from the Duc de Gramont, accompanying the official instruction, it was stated that what was desired was an order from "the Prussian King's government" to Leopold to reconsider his decision. This private suggestion, explanation, or direction, whichever it may have been intended to be, Benedetti properly disregarded. From the very beginning the king had asserted that the affair was one with which he, as sovereign of Prussia, had nothing to do. Whether this position was sound or unsound, is a question which it is unnecessary for our present purpose to consider. It was a position from which the king, after having once assumed and maintained it, could not depart without self-contradiction and humiliation. Assuming, therefore, that the object of the French government was to preserve peace by securing the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidacy, Benedetti forbore to make a demand which would have rendered compliance with the views of France impossible, and confined himself to the task of inducing the king to advise a withdrawal. Public opinion in Germany had already been inflamed by an immoderate declaration made by Gramont to the Corps Législatif on the 6th of July. It was not desirable to multiply mistakes.

Benedetti had two audiences of the king on the 11th of July. The king intimated that he was in communication with Prince Leopold and with the latter's father, Prince Anthony, and said that, if Leopold withdrew his candidacy, he would approve his decision ; and he asked Benedetti to telegraph to Gramont that he expected a communication from Leopold in a day or two, and that he would then give a definite answer. The reasons

which moved the king in this course are manifest. For the purpose of preserving his consistency, he desired that Leopold's renunciation should appear to be a spontaneous act; but he was willing to invest it with a definite character by giving it his approval. On the afternoon of the 12th of July, the Spanish ambassador at Paris received a telegram from Prince Anthony announcing that Leopold had withdrawn his candidacy. This announcement the Spanish ambassador immediately communicated to the Duc de Gramont and to certain members of the Diplomatic Corps, and the news at once became public. The press and certain politicians were highly indignant at this mode of announcing the withdrawal. Unaware of the state of the negotiations, and of the promise of the king to communicate to Benedetti his approval of the withdrawal, they saw in the announcement only a fresh "insult." The Duc de Gramont, yielding to the excitement of the moment, became aggressive. He instructed Benedetti to demand of the king guarantees for the future, in the form of an engagement that he would, if necessary, exert his authority to prevent a renewal of the candidacy. Such a pledge the king refused to give. He pronounced it "a new and unexpected concession," which he was unable to make. But he renewed his assurance that when the messenger, who was expected in the course of the day, had arrived from Sigmaringen with the renunciation of Prince Leopold, he would send for Benedetti and make the communication which he had previously promised. Later in the day, however, the king, instead of sending for Benedetti, made the communication through one of his aides-de-camp, and when Benedetti solicited yet another audience, the king informed him in the same manner that, having given his entire and unreserved approbation to the withdrawal of Prince Leopold, he could do no more. The king thus refused, firmly and absolutely, further to discuss the subject of guarantees for the future. He was moved to this decision not only by the demand presented through Benedetti, but also perhaps by another demand or request made by the Duc de Gramont through the German ambassador at Paris for a letter in the nature of an apology for having permitted the candidature. "At Ems," says Benedetti, "there was neither an insulter nor a person insulted." The king did not refuse to receive him, except for the purpose of discussing the subject of guarantees. If the new demands had not been made, everything would, he maintains, have been satisfactorily settled.

Such is the view set forth by Count Benedetti in his essay on his mission to Ems. One is, therefore, somewhat surprised to find, in his essay on the Emperor William and Prince Bismarck, the following charge: "He [William] arranged with Prince Anthony for his son's renunciation to take place in a way and under circumstances that would be disobliging to France. Whilst sacrificing the principle, he applied himself with immense skill, we should say with monstrous treachery, to discover a way to entangle the Imperial [French] government in the form. We know how well he succeeded." If this charge be true, the Duc de Gramont was right in saying that Benedetti failed to accomplish anything at Ems. Benedetti

did not insist even upon the king's advising, much less ordering Prince Leopold to withdraw his candidacy. He thought his point was gained by securing the actual withdrawal, together with the king's express approval of it. There was much sense in this view. But if, in reality, the king was seeking to be disobliging to France, and to entrap her with the form of the withdrawal, Count Benedetti committed a grave error; for he himself considered the king's course satisfactory, and in a sense made himself a party to it. The reason why he did so is clearly disclosed in his account of his mission. It was the same reason that led him to abstain from demanding that Leopold be ordered, and even from insisting that he be expressly advised, to withdraw. If Count Benedetti, as he himself declares, refrained from assuming such an attitude because it would have wounded the king and given him ground to believe that there was a design to humiliate him, it is only reasonable to concede that the king was actuated in the course he took by the desire to avoid any compromise of his dignity. The king cannot be charged by the French ambassador with insincerity in having exhibited precisely the same measure of solicitude for his own dignity as the ambassador himself considered just and necessary.

In regard to the incidents preceding the outbreak of the war, Count Benedetti makes in the present volume no disclosures that cannot be found in his volume *Ma Mission en Prusse*, published in 1871. He dwells much on the subject of Bismarck's editing of the despatch from Ems—an act which he considers decisive of the question who was responsible for the war. Count Benedetti has been charged in the French press with incapacity in not having learned at the time the contents of that despatch. He thinks this charge unreasonable and unjust, and he certainly is entitled to our sympathy in this regard. But, can the ultimate responsibility for the war be said to depend on the phrasing of the summary which Bismarck prepared of the telegraphic report from Ems? This is a question to which Count Benedetti does not help us to give an affirmative answer. He condemns his government for having neglected to provide the means "to carry on a war which had been foreseen and had become inevitable since Sadowa." Why had it become "inevitable"? The only reason Count Benedetti discloses is that which may be inferred from his treatment of the unification of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia as a menace to the primacy of France. Writing to his government in 1868, he said: "German union will soon be accomplished; ought we to accept it? If so, do not let us conceal the fact that we shall give it a kindly welcome. . . . In the contrary event, let us prepare for war without respite, and let us form a clear idea as to what assistance Austria is likely to be to us." He now refers to this despatch and triumphantly inquires whether it does not show that he "had long since had a presentiment of the conflict, [and] of Prussia's well-determined intention to provoke it?" It certainly shows that he had a presentiment of the conflict.

We naturally look with interest for what Count Benedetti has to say in regard to the famous draft-treaty in his handwriting, which Bismarck

exhibited to the Diplomatic Corps at Berlin after the outbreak of the war, and which disposed of Luxemburg, and contingently of Belgium, in the interest of France. Count Benedetti's explanation of the transaction is that, while he held the pen, the proposals came from Bismarck. Admitting this to be true, does it greatly alter the aspect of the case? If Benedetti was victimized, it was by the easy process of leading him on in a path which he desired to tread. He himself declares that it was his opinion that the equilibrium of power, which had been disturbed by the acquisitions of Prussia, could be restored only by the annexation to France of adjoining countries, and that it was under the influence of this conviction that he assumed "to confer with Count Bismarck on the bases of his own constant overtures." It is obvious that Bismarck was not seeking the aggrandizement of France. He was playing a game in diplomacy, as he admitted in 1870, when he made the draft-treaty public.

I should be glad if I could praise the manner in which Count Benedetti's volume has been translated. The translation, however, betrays numerous defects. The form in which many of the sentences are cast is not English, and can scarcely be called French, and words are frequently employed which indicate a dictionary rather than a literary knowledge of the English language.

J. B. MOORE.

A List of Early American Imprints belonging to the Library of the Massachusetts Historical Society. With an Introduction and Notes by SAMUEL A. GREEN. (Cambridge. 1895. Pp. 137.)

A List of Early American Imprints, 1640-1700, belonging to the Library of the American Antiquarian Society. With an Introduction and Notes by NATHANIEL PAINE. (Worcester. 1896. Pp. 80.)

THESE two works may be considered as parts of one whole, for the second list was undertaken at the suggestion of the author of the first, and is so thoroughly a supplement that no duplication is attempted, a mere reference to the title in the other book being thought sufficient. Together they constitute a long step towards a list of books printed in New England down to 1700, Dr. Green's list embracing about three hundred titles, and Mr. Paine's about the same number, one-half of which, however, were also in Dr. Green's. Thus, in round figures, the two works include four hundred and fifty distinct titles, and Mr. Paine in his preface states that "the two lists probably contain the titles of nearly all the known publications now extant, issued from the press in British North America from 1640 to 1700 inclusive." We presume in this statement, Mr. Paine means more specifically the press of New England, as the Philadelphia and New York presses were both quite active within these years, yet have but few representatives in these lists. Even with this deduction from the statement, it is still open to question. Without relying on Thomas and Haven's list,